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Leon S. Lipson 
The background of Marxist-Leninist 
theory with which Soviet international 
law began permitted, and indeed re-
quired, an analysis of the contemporary 
nation-state system from without. So 
long as a Soviet analyst could in thought 
remain outside the system, he found not 
much difficulty with the conundrum 
that has troubled so much of the writing 
about international law since the fic-
tions of medieval universality broke 
down; that is, the problem to which you 
addressed yourselves yesterday after-
noon, of the efficacy and even the 
existence of international law in the 
absence of a single compelling enforce-
ment machinery. That problem has 
seemed especially acute to Western 
seholars under the influence of what 
they thought to be the implications of 
Austinian positivism. It was taken care 
of in early Soviet terms by a theory of 
the organization of society which re-
fused to look on states as the ultimate 
aggregates of legitimatized power. In-
stead it emphasized the controlling role 
of the bourgeoisie, a class that was 
supposed to overlie all society, regard-
less of political boundaries, in those 
parts of the world which had attained 
industrial civilization. We must remem-
ber that one of the reasons for calling 
upon the proletarians of the world to 
unite was that it was assumed that for 
many purposes the bourgeoisie of the 
world were already united. 
International law in a bourgeois 
setting, so the theory ran, was sanc-
tioned by the transverse power of the 
global bourgeoisie up to the point where 
imperialistic conflict, caused by the 
growing contradictions of capitalist 
society and capitalist economics, was 
expected to lead to a breakdown of the 
system and open the way for a pro-
letarian revolution and the establish-
ment of socialism. Under this analysis, 
international law is trivial until the 
moment it becomes obsolete. 
Before and for some time after its 
occurrence, the Russian revolution was 
expected to touch off a continuing 
series of revolutions in the more indus-
trial countries of, at least, continental 
Europe. As Taracouzio put it: 
With ... the advent of a single 
world-wide denationalized, class-
less society, there [would] be no 
place for a system of law regu-
lating the international life of 
independent states. International 
law [would] be converted into a 
purely domestic inter-Soviet law, 
a federal law for a world-wide 
union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics. 
It was no accident-to use a favorite 
Soviet phrase that is typically redun-
dant, for under the philosophy of 
dialectical materialism it never is an 
accident-that the name given to the 
new federation at the time of its official 
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formation at the end of 1922 contained 
no geographically limiting term. "Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, " while the 
word Soviet betrays its Russian origin, is 
in principle capable of expansion with-
out incongruity to embrace any terri-
tory on earth, or beyond. 
Events in the first five years after the 
1917 Revolution required a modifica-
tion of these perspectives. The revolu-
tion did not spread to all of Europe, 
though there were brief episodes in 
Germany and Hungary. Conflicts on the 
perimeter of the former Russian Empire 
with national and anti-Bolshevist forces 
along the Baltic coast, in Poland, and in 
the Caucasus led to temporary inde-
pendence for some and to inclusion 
within the federation for others. For-
eign intervention in Russia by some 
fourteen states from 1917 to 1922, 
aimed first mainly at supporting the 
forces continuing the war against Ger-
many, later at safeguarding lives and 
property of foreigners and (in a con-
fused and ineffectual way) assisting the 
efforts of anti-Bolshevist armies, may 
have helped to teach the Bolshevik 
publicists gradually that national bound-
aries can be ignored in more than one 
direction and that territorial integrity 
has its uses. 
The stabilization of the international 
situation in the early twenties included 
on the Soviet side a partial settling-
down to statehood. For strategic rea-
sons it proved necessary to coexist 
temporarily with other states that re-
mained opposed to the Bolshevik revo-
lution; for economic reasons it was 
necessary for the young, ravaged, and 
very poor Soviet state to establish com-
mercial relations abroad. True, Lenin 
and his successors have presented the 
case as though the economic necessity 
constrained not the Soviet Union but 
the outside world; but that was a 
common turn of Soviet, particularly 
Leninist, argumentation that did not 
affect the substance. 
In this state of affairs, Soviet Russia 
necessarily became a part of the interna-
tional community that its leaders anal-
yzed and assailed. Unable thenceforth 
to denounce all existing rules and 
processes of international law, the 
Soviet writers appealed openly to ex-
pediency as the principle of selection. 
As a Soviet writer remarked at the time: 
The situation became rather 
ambiguous. On the one hand, 
Soviet Russia openly and loudly 
declared its denunciation of all 
treaties inherited from Tsarism 
and the Government of Kerensky, 
of all secret conventions, military 
debts, privileges of exploitation 
and imperialist obligations, and on 
the other, its official representa-
tive often demanded the execu-
tion of minor agreements, refer-
ring to the fact that beneath the 
text were affixed the seal and the 
signature of the Imperial [Tsarist] 
Ambassador. 
As the strategic retreat of the New 
Economic Policy in 1921-1928 required 
some limited encouragement for foreign 
technicians and supply contracts, it was 
discovered that even the dictates of 
expediency can lead in different direc-
tions for the short term and the long; in 
the longer-term interest of the Soviet 
Union it was thought to be expedient to 
display-and here the etymology is in-
tentionally convergent-the status and 
stability of a state. Thus we saw the 
development, in the mid-twenties, of 
"The International Law of the Transi-
tional Period," in which an attempt was 
made to reconcile the millennial per-
spectives of pre-Revolutionary Marxist-
Leninist theory with the contemporary 
coexistence of the Soviet Union and 
surrounding, or encircling states. At this 
time, the attitude of the Soviet Union 
to the traditional norms of international 
law was said by the conciliatory wing of 
Soviet international jurists to be what 
we might call consistently inconsistent, 
in the sense that the Soviet Union took 
what it liked and rejected what it did 
not like in conformity to its general 
policies. Thus the Soviet Union was said 
to "exclude" such notions as extraterri-
toriality, special concessionary privi-
leges, and mandates; the Soviet Union 
"selected," meaning chose to accept, 
such institutions at consular and diplo-
matic immunities; the Soviet Union 
"interpreted" other doctrines of inter-
national law as its interests dictated. 
The differentiated attitude toward 
traditional doctrines of international 
law assured the conformity of doctrine 
to current foreign policy. It also, how-
ever, presupposed an awkward conces-
sion on what in the martial Soviet 
terminology was known as the theoreti-
cal front. Here you must, for a minute 
or two, wander with me through the 
thicket of Marxist dialectic. It had been 
accepted teaching that social institu-
tions, including law, must belong either 
to the base or to the superstructure. The 
base included preeminently the relation-
ships of production. Between base and 
superstructure was a causal connection, 
operating preponderantly in one direc-
tion: the base determined the super-
structure, though it was at times con-
ceded that in some respects the super-
structure might have a back-influence 
on the base. But if anything was central 
to the Soviet Marxist catechism, it was 
that the base, in the Soviet Union, 
differed fundamentally from the base in 
the countries of capitalism. That served 
as a convenient polemical framework in 
the Soviet comparative analysis of in-
ternal legal systems; but it seemed to 
imply that the same international law 
could not exist for the Soviet Union as 
for "bourgeois" countries. The dilemma 
was that if international law belonged to 
the superstructure, states with different 
bases could not be acknowledged to 
agree upon international rules so long as 
it remained dogma that base determines 
superstructure; but if one assigned inter-
national law to the base, then one 
denied the primacy of productive rela-
tionships and called into question the 
103 
uniqueness of Soviet society which was 
so important for the self-image and the 
propaganda of the new leadership. 
If this problem had arisen in the 
early 1950's, when some of the founda-
tions of Marxism-Leninism were being 
revisited, it could have been swept 
under by a stronger assertion of the 
superstructure's partial independence of 
the base. As it was, in the 1920's it was 
necessary to resort to two other ex-
planations. The first of these was the 
compromise formula, which most Soviet 
definitions of international law have 
included since, to the effect that inter-
national law is the complex of norms 
that regulate relations between states in 
the process of their struggle and collabo-
ration, or conflict and cooperation, and 
so on. The second, which is a feature of 
the Stalin period, rests on the distinc-
tion familiar to us and found in many 
corners of Soviet thought between form 
and content; just as a given internal 
legal, economic, or social institution can 
be bourgeois in form but Socialist in 
content, so differing bases can infuse a 
verbally identic form in international 
law with different content. A similar 
problem encountered later, after the 
Second World War, in characterizing the 
relations between countries in the 
Soviet camp, was met by the distinction 
between letter and spirit; the rules that 
were obeyed only in the letter by 
bourgeois countries were infused with a 
different spirit when applied between 
friendly socialist countries. 
During the 1920's and 1930's the 
Soviet Union carried on treaty relations, 
entered into international supply con-
tracts, conducted exchanges of goods, 
took part in certain international organi-
zations, and lived an international life, 
though at a level of activity far below 
that of the West. The more powedul 
Hitler became, the more traditional 
Soviet international law became. 
After the Second World War, the 
Soviet Union came to playa leading role 
in world politics. The Soviet attitudes 
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toward the structure of international 
politics have undergone certain changes, 
and the distribution of emphasis in 
Soviet international law is correspond-
ingly being modified. The process was 
submerged for a while in the suppres-
sion of foreign contacts that accom-
panied the purges of the late nineteen 
forties and early fifties, but there is 
considerable evidence that it had begun 
well before Stalin's death. The chief 
factors in the process seem to have 
included, beside the temporary power 
vacuum in Europe and the emergence of 
a loosely bipolar confrontation, the 
increasing inability to tolerate high risks 
of large-scale war after the development 
of nuclear weapons, particularly after 
the development of the hydrogen bomb; 
the emergence of new nations from the 
passing of the old colonialism in Africa 
and Asia; and the coming to power in 
neighboring countries of regimes called 
socialist and prepared, on the whole, to 
act in accord with Soviet moves in the 
international arena 
In Soviet foreign policy these factors 
led to the peace campaigns, in new 
form; the support for "national-libera-
tion movements" even at the cost of 
temporary eclipse for local communist 
parties; the grant of a substantial 
amount of foreign aid, deployed of 
course for political effect, but often 
useful, nevertheless; and the renewal of 
the campaign for general and complete 
disarmament. (By the way, for those of 
you who might otherwise be inclined to 
date the Soviet campaign for general 
and complete disarmament from the 
Khrnshchev period, it would be instruc-
tive to consider the judgment made by 
George Grafton Wilson that: 
One of the most striking 
features of Soviet policy has been 
advocacy of complete disarma-
ment, land, maritime and aerial, in 
contrast to the policy of most 
states, which have favored varying 
degrees of mere limitation of 
armament. 
The striking thing about that quotation 
is that it was published twenty-eight 
years ago.) 
At present the Soviet Union is one of 
the most active participants in interna-
tional relations and a prominent actor in 
the stages of international law. Though 
the Soviet Union is absent from some 
important international organizations, it 
is present and active in many, and some 
of these are closely concerned with 
problems of international law. It has 
sent judges to the International Court of 
Justice; it takes part in the work of the 
International Law Commission; its 
representatives make legal arguments in 
many bodies of the United Nations; it 
sends delegations to nongovernmental 
bodies like the International Law Asso-
ciation and the International Associa-
tion of LegaL Sciences; its scholars pro-
duce yearbooks of international law, 
textbooks on international law (one of 
which was published in English transla-
tion not long ago), and numerous mono-
graphs and articles; it is party to scores 
of bilateral and multilateral ~rrreements, 
not all limited to the Soviet camp; its 
agents conclude many foreign trade 
agreements, providing for arbitration in 
Moscow before a vigorous, and, we are 
told, reasonably fair arbitration com-
mission. 
This activity is enough to provide 
some evidence of the characteristics of 
Soviet utterances in international law. I 
should say the chief characteristics, 
aside from the current emphasis upon 
the principle of coexistence (to which I 
shall return), are that contemporary 
Soviet utterances in international law 
are predominantly officia~ moralistic, 
projective, offensive, and underdevel-
oped. These traits are not wholly absent 
from Western work in international law, 
but the differences of degree are great. 
As someone has said, the difference 
between a difference in kind and a 
difference in degree is in itself only a 
difference in degree. 
By official I mean that Soviet work 
in international law supports current 
Sovict foreign policy with unremitting 
fidelity. Current Soviet foreign policy is 
always defended as legal; even past 
Soviet foreign policy is defended as legal 
though the policies may have been 
abandoned. Never is there a public 
statement by a Soviet private jurist 
calling into question the action of the 
Soviet government To put it shortly, 
every Soviet writer on international law 
is on active duty. Variations do not 
often exist, and when they do they tend 
to be either on subjects of slight current 
practical importance, or on the question 
of which reason is to be preferred for 
supporting the legality of given Soviet 
behavior or the illegality of given be· 
havior of an adversary. Thus every 
utterance from a Soviet source on inter-
national law must be taken as "inter-
ested," that is, the source must be 
considered. This fact need not always 
tell against the intellectual quality of 
what they write; in this country, law-
yers' briefs often make impressive con-
tributions to the thinking of the judges 
to whom they are directed, but they are 
recognized nonetheless as briefs. 
Soviet argument on questions of in-
ternational law is easy and cogent once 
you grant the invariant major premise 
tllat the Soviet Union is right. From this 
premise, combined with the minor pre-
mise describing in tendentious terms 
whatever the Soviet Government has 
done or advocated in a particular case is 
right 
If this judgment seems harsh to you, 
consider the following typical illustra-
tion. A respected Soviet international 
jurist discusses the relations between 
states within the Soviet orbit when 
faced with internal law on the one hand 
and international law on the other: 
In the practice of the Soviet 
Union and the People's Democ-
r a cies, conflicts between the 
norms of international law and 
ilie norms of internal law are 
impossible. The socialist states, 
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strictly observing international 
law, cannot either impose or 
accept any of its norms that 
would contradict the principles of 
internal law of the contracting 
states. On the other hand, strictly 
observing international agree-
ments, they cannot utter any 
norms of internal law that would 
contradict their international obli-
gations. 
Again, on the right of asylum, a 
statement is made that convinces only 
one who is already committed to the 
major premise: 
The right of asylum is formally 
acknowledged by all states as a 
current principle of international 
law. In the USSR and the coun-
tries of People's Democracy it is 
available to progres-
sives .... Asylum in socialist 
countries is not afforded to diver-
sionists, terrorists and others of 
that ilk. In many capitalist coun-
tries, the representatives of lead-
ing and progressive mankind are in 
fact deprived of asylum, which, 
however, is widely afforded to all 
sorts of diversionists, terrorists 
and traitors who have committed 
grave crimes against their home-
lands. 
In final illustration of this official 
characteristic I should like to correct 
the statement made yesterday, referring 
to violations of treaty by the Soviet 
Government. This is contradicted by the 
following information furnished by the 
authoritative current Soviet textbook 
on international law, which reports: 
The Soviet Union, like the 
other socialist countries, stands 
for the strict observance of obliga-
tions assumed under international 
agreements, as has been demon-
strated by the entire history of 
Soviet foreign relations .... The 
Soviet Union's strict fulfillment of 
its obligations under the U.N. 
Charter and other international 
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treaties clearly demonstrates the 
Soviet Union's adherence to one 
of the basic principles of interna-
tional law-the principle pacta 
sunt seroanda. 
The imperialist states fre-
quently refuse to fulfill their obli-
gations, and make international 
treaties mere scraps of paper. But 
it must not be concluded from 
this that international treaty links 
are unstable. There are now strong 
social and political forces op-
posing arbitrary action. 
Perhaps at the time when yesterday's 
speaker mentioned Soviet treaty viola-
tions he did not have present in his 
mind the major premise that the Soviet 
Union does not vjolate treaties. 
Sovet international law is official, 
then. It also is moralistic. In interna-
tionallaw, as in domestic law and some 
other areas of culture, Soviet thinking 
has undergone a transformation since 
the days when the Revolution was 
young. The very values and principles 
and even rules that used to be derided as 
bQurgeois are now not merely accepted 
but expropriated. No longer is the 
Soviet Union presented as the bearer of 
a supermorality, transcending the hypo-
critical and outworn morality of the 
bourgeois past; now it is the Soviet 
Union that has inherited the obligations 
that used to be borne by the bourgeoisie 
in the days of its vigor. A Soviet scholar 
mentions as one category of "generally 
recognized principles of international 
law": 
principles and concepts that 
entered into international law dur-
ing the struggle of the bourgeoisie 
with feudalism under the influ-
ence of the democratic and na-
tional-liberation movement. They 
above all define basic rights and 
duties of states in international 
relations, and then guarantees of 
the rights of the population and 
various other sides of intern a-
tionallife. Such are the principles 
of sovereignty and equal rights of 
states, non-intervention ... in-
violability of state territory, the 
institutions of citizenship, plebi-
scite, rights of asylum for political 
emigrants, etc. These democratic 
principles and institutions, which 
reflected in their time the de-
mands of "the broad masses who 
took part in bourgeois revolutions 
an dna tional-liberation move-
ments, were taken up and raised 
to a new height hy the Soviet 
Union and other socialist states. 
The same moralistic tone can be ob-
served in the Soviet espousal of disarma-
ment, now about to be proclaimed not 
merely a policy, but also an existing 
principle of international law. Ex-
pediency is (officially) shuffled; 
morality is trumpeted. 
Official, moralistic, projective. I use 
the term projective in the sense in which 
psychologists use it when speaking of 
the tendency to attribute to others the 
ideas and intentions that one must deny 
in one's self. For example, it is commo~ 
to meet in Soviet work condemnation 
of the United States for concluding 
agreements "involving unequal rights" 
as with the Marshall Plan-which, as you 
will remember, the Soviet Union kept 
some Central European satellites from 
joining when they wished to. For 
another example, I heard a Soviet schol-
ar in Moscow insist to some colle~rrues 
planning a work on disarmament that 
they must expose the Western practice, 
which he said was to advocate dis-
armament not merely hypocritically and 
without intending to disarm, but pre-
cisely in order to lull the Soviet Union 
and other peace-loving states into a 
dangerous reduction of their armed 
strength. For a final example, when 
Soviet publicists a couple of years ago 
stepped up their campaign against pub-
lished American discussion of orbiting 
space weapons, it was fairly clear that 
the Soviet Union was well on the way to 
a decision to develop those weapons. 
Official, moralistic, projective, offen-
sive. This term is used in the military 
sense. Soviet work in international law 
is predominantly polemical, and the 
polemics are based on the theory that 
the best defense is a good offense, like 
the theories held by the French general 
staff before the First World War or the 
old management of the Boston Red 
Sox. Thus the condemnation by the 
United Nations of the use of Soviet 
tanks and troops to suppress the Hun-
garian revolution in 1956 is referred to 
by a Soviet seholar of international law 
in this way: 
The Soviet Union and other 
socialist states spoke out de-
cisively against the efforts of the 
U.S.A. and its partners to make 
use of the United Nations Organi-
zation as an instrument of inter-
vention in the internal affairs of 
the Hungarian People's Republic 
after the counterrevolutionary 
rebellion, inspired by foreign re-
action, had been crushed in No-
vember 1956. 
The same observation of offensive-
ness can be made of the continuing 
Soviet emphasis upon outlawry of ag-
gression, or the combination of high 
military expenditures with high volume 
of disarmament campaigning, or the 
criticism of the American "voting 
machine" in the United Nations to draw 
fire away from the Soviet veto. You 
may not all be familiar with the old 
story of the visitor to Moscow who, on 
being shown a new subway station, 
admired the decoration but after a while 
asked his host why there weren't any 
trains, and was answered, "And what 
about the lynching of negroes in your 
Southern states?" (Correspondingly, it 
is no answer to Soviet criticism of U.S. 
racial discrimination to say that the 
Soviets have a housing shortage or even 
that they have racial discrimination.) 
My last epithet was that present-day 
Soviet international law was under-
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developed. In one sense it is underdevel-
oped in that it seems designed to win 
the support and the votes of the under-
developed nations, or, as we are now 
calling them in an effort to seem less 
condescending, the new or newly devel-
oping nations. The analysis of interna-
tional law, the choice of emphasis, the 
thrust of the moralizing, is calculated to 
appeal to ex-colonial countries and 
other suffering from the present fact or 
the recollection of Western domination. 
The attitudes that seemed to suit the 
Soviet Union in the days of its weakness 
are found appropriately transferable to 
those countries, and the gulf between 
(say) Mali or Bolivia and the Soviet 
Union of today is ignored. There are 
still gains to be made by playing the role 
of the underdog. 
In another sense, Soviet international 
law today is intellectually underdevel-
oped. When I looked in yesterday on 
Professor Sohn's class I heard him say 
that, if you look at Soviet work in 
international law and deleted the obei-
sances to Lenin and the criticism of the 
imperialists, what you would have left 
would be something like our own work 
in international law, only not as good. 
He attributed this to restrictions on 
access to Western literature and Western 
jurists. He did not, as I understood 
him-nor do I-make any reflections on 
the personal abilities of Soviet jurists. 
He might have added that in interna-
tional law activity, as in many other 
respects, Soviet society today has points 
in common with the Western world of 
two or three generations ago, not with 
the Western world of today or (let us 
hope) with the Western world of, say, 
1984. The improvement in the quality 
of the work of the newer generation of 
Soviet jurists is welcome but still minor. 
Soviet international law, far from being 
the wave of the future, is intellectually a 
stagnant pool left over from the past. 
Professor Lissitzyn once put it more 
kindly when he wrote of their technical 
conservatism. Many rules are stated and 
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restated without criticism or reflection. 
Soviet doctrine on the sources of law 
follows older practice, as you know, in 
exalting treaties and depreciating cus-
tom. Soviet doctrine on the supposed 
conflict between internal law and inter-
national law comes down-except for 
relations between states in what is mis-
leadingly called the socialist camp-on 
the side of the primacy of internal law. 
You heard yesterday of the rapid 
growth of legal doctrine on the conti-
nental shelf from the time of President 
Truman's proclamation in 1945 to the 
Geneva Conference on the Law of the 
Sea in 1958; but before that the Soviet 
publicis.ts had poured scorn on the idea 
that the rights of a coastal state to 
resources on the continental shelf were 
becoming recognized in international 
law. As one of them said: 
Thus a unilateral declaration 
proclaiming the seizure of open 
sea belonging to all and making it 
one's own property is turned into 
a norm of international law with 
the naked use of the machinery of 
the "legalization" of seizures, [the 
Americans declare, the satellites 
"follow," "scholarship" recog-
nizes-and behold, a norm is 
born!]. 
Technical conservatism does not 
mean that the Soviet Union is satisfied 
with the present state of generally 
accepted international law. Usually they 
cannot directly admit dissatisfaction 
without denying to the norms with 
which they disagree the dignity of being 
called existing rules of international law; 
and they can playas many games as we 
can with the lex lata and the tex 
ferenda, which may be rudely translated 
as calling the rule that helps you the law 
that is, and calling the rule that helps 
the other man the law that he wishes 
were the law. But they have other 
devices too. To look at those devices in 
perspective, let us return to their theme 
of peaceful coexistence. 
Peaceful Coexistence. In some 
pronouncements of Soviet at..thorities, 
the principle of peaceful coexistence has 
been said to be not merely the basis of 
the Soviet view of international law, but 
the basis of all international law today, 
and not merely the basis, but the key, 
or the core, of all international law. It is 
even said that international law today 
has become the law of peaceful co-
existence. So important a concept 
deserves our attention. 
At the outset we are not to confuse 
"Peaceful Coexistence," in quotation 
marks and with initial capitals, with 
peaceful coexistence in the literal sense 
of the term. For example, it is clear that 
the term in Soviet usage does not mean 
condemnation of all war. Wars that 
serve the ends of Soviet foreign policy 
are given the label of wars of national 
liberation or revolutionary civil wars 
and are accepted as just. 
It is fairly clear also that the term in 
Soviet usage does not connote relation-
ships of trust, friendship, agreement, or 
free communication between the 
peoples of the "peacefully coexisting" 
states. A striking confirmation of the 
freedom of maneuver left to the Soviet 
Union by the principle of peaceful 
coexistence was noticed last year by 
some close readers of the Soviet press. 
On January 30, 1962, Suslov, the chief 
Soviet Marxist theoretician (next to 
Chairman Khrushchev), made a speech 
at a conference of Soviet university 
teachers in the social sciences. His 
speech was published in Pravda on 
February 4th. According to that report, 
he said: 
Peaceful coexistence means the 
coexistence of states with dif-
ferent social systems. It means the 
rejection of war, the settlement of 
disputes between states through 
negotiations. It means the refusal 
to violate the territorial integrity 
of states, the refusal to export 
revolution and export counter-
revolution. Finally, peaceful co-
existence is economic rivalry of 
states, agreements, trading rela-
tions on the basis of mutual ad-
vantage between states. 
Notice the refusal to export revolution 
and export counterrevolution. 
Thirteen days later the same speech 
was published again in the chief theo-
retical magazine, Kommunist, here 
Suslov was made to say: 
Peaceful coexistence means 
. . . the refusal to violate the terri-
torial integrity of states, the in-
admissibility of the export of 
coun terrevolu tion .... 
The reference to the refusal to export 
revolution had now been deleted, ap-
parently at the last minute from galley 
proof or page proof; the key sentence in 
Kommunist is very widely spaced to 
make up for the deletion. 
Peaceful coexistence in the sphere of 
ideology has been repudiated by the 
Soviet leadership in many statements, 
directed principally at the Soviet popu-
lation to make sure they do not get any 
wrong idea. That the idea, though not 
the precise words, of "peaceful co-
existence" was used as a tactic in 
foreign policy, was made clear in the 
earlier and more candid days of the 
Soviet regime when Lenin said, in a 
letter to his representative at the Genoa 
Conference of 1922: 
•.. we, communists, have our 
own communist program [Third 
In ternational ] ; nevertheless we 
consider it our duty as merchants 
to support [even if there is only 
1/10,000 chance] the pacifists in 
the other, i.e., bourgeois 
camp .... It will be both biting 
and "amicable" and will help to 
demoralize the enemy. With such 
tactics we will win even if Genoa 
fails. 
As recently as early 1961, Chairman 
Khrushchev referred to the policy of 
peaceful coexistence as "a form of 
intensive economic, political and 
ideological struggle of the proletariat 
against the aggressive forces of im-
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perialism in the international arena." 
The current Program of the Communist 
Party uses similar language. 
Thus the fact that the considerable 
resources of scholarly and lay communi-
cation at the disposal of the Soviet 
leaders are directed toward the celebra-
tion of the importance of "Peaceful 
Coexistence" says nothing necessarily 
about the probable foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union . 
The term, as such, has been found in 
Soviet literature bearing as early a date 
as 1920. Though contemporary Soviet 
writing invariably describes the principle 
of peaceful coexistence as Leninist, by 
the way, the term does not seem to have 
been used by Lenin. It was Chicherin, 
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
who referred to the Peace Treaty with 
Estonia as the "first experiment in 
peaceful coexistence with bourgeois 
states." Twenty years later, as we know, 
the state of Estonia ceased to exist and 
it became unnecessary to coexist with 
her, except in the sense that the robin, 
in Don Marquis's old poem, coexisted 
with the worm it had swallowed. 
While peaceful coexistence was often 
mentioned by Stalin, especially during 
the period of the United Front in the 
thirties and the period of wartime col-
laboration in the early forties, it is only 
since 1956 that the slogan has become 
central to Soviet pronouncements. At 
that time it took off from the Panch 
Sheela, the Five Principles, which had 
been proclaimed in the Sino-Indian pact 
of 1954 and expanded in the Bandung 
Declaration of 1955. Later the major 
share of the credit' was ascribed more 
directly to Lenin. As a principle in 
international law, it has been treated in 
numerous Soviet monographs and arti-
cles since 1956 and pressed vigorously 
by Soviet representatives at interna-
tional meetings of governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations. 
To distinguish between the political 
and the legal purposes of the Soviet 
emphasis on "Peaceful Coexistence" 
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implies a distinction between law and 
policy that is not made by the Soviets, 
except for external consumption; but 
we can distinguish between general stra-
tegic purposes and technical doctrinal 
purposes. 
The strategic uses of "Peaceful Co-
existence" vary with the audience. Afro-
Asian audiences in general are assured 
that the Soviet Union sides with them in 
their campaigns for the Panch Sheela 
and, more basically, that the Soviet 
Union as an important European power 
takes seriously a form of words that the 
Mro-Asians profess to take seriously. 
With other non-Soviet audiences, except 
for Communist Party members or 
sympathizers, the aim is to influence 
non-Soviet disarmament, to attract East-
West trade, and to enlist support for 
various specific Soviet moves in foreign 
affairs from time to time. With commu-
nist audiences, the declaration of ad-
herence to the policy of peaceful co-
existence is a taking of sides on one of 
the main issues between the Chinese and 
Soviet communist leadership, which 
may be defined as the issue whether the 
expansion of the communist system can 
be rapidly achieved without actions that 
increase the risk of worldwide nuclear 
war. Recently, before ~ Soviet audience, 
some Soviet international lawyers took 
pains to distinguish 
the concept of peaceful coexist-
ence, as the fundamental principle 
of international law which is also 
the basis of the foreign policy of 
peace-loving states [from] ... the 
concept of coexistence [note the 
absence of the adjective] of the 
two systems as an indication of 
the stage of history referred to by 
V.I. Lenin, a stage which is inevit-
able by virtue of the fact that the 
socialist revolution does not tri-
umph simultaneously in all coun-
tries. 
The fact that all these various audiences 
eavesdrop on one another has compli-
cated the task of Soviet propagandists, 
but they are assisted by the durable 
propensity of us all to hear what wc 
wish to hear and close our ears to what 
we would rather not hear. 
For some of these purposes, the 
content of the principle has to be 
spelled out, though not in great detail. 
A minimum statement would include 
the Panch Sheela: these five points refer 
to respect for sovereignty, nonaggres-
sion, nonintervention in the internal 
affairs of other states, respect for 
equality of states, and peaceful coexist-
ence itself, which in Afro-Asian usage is 
one of the five points, but in Soviet 
usage embraces all the others. Under 
pressure from international diplomatic 
and legal questioning, some additional 
content, still at a high level of abstrac-
tion, has been given to the principle of 
peaceful coexistence; it has been said to 
include, for example, in Dr. Lapenna's 
convenient summary: 
1. Coexistence is "a funda-
mental principle of international 
law. " 
2. Peace without threat or use 
of force; settling disputes by 
peaceful means; individual or col-
lective measures, in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter, 
to prevent or suppress acts of 
aggression; prevention or suppres-
sion of war propaganda; promo-
tion of the implementation of 
general and complete disarma-
ment. 
3. Cooperation in the field of 
economy, social and political 
questions, science and culture. 
4. Sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; the right of peoples and 
nations to self-determination; 
anticolonialism. 
5. Noninterference in the m-
ternal affairs of other states. 
6. Equality of states; represen-
tation of states in international 
organizations in conformity with 
the interest of the three groups of 
states. This is a promoting of the 
Troika idea to the rank of a 
principle of coexistence. 
7. Fulfillment in good faith of 
international obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of 
international law. 
On the whole, it is fair to say that 
the Soviet publicists have not shown 
themselves jealous for the purity of 
their principle; they have seemed willing 
provisionally to accept many of the 
formulations offered by others as com-
ponents of the principle. The reason for 
this hospitality is, I think, the same as 
the reason for the failure hitherto to 
specify what Professor McWhinney calls 
concrete secondary principles, that is, 
principles sufficiently meaningful to be 
arguable. To make clear what I believe 
this reason to be, we should back up far 
enough to look at the position of the 
Soviet Union in the international legal 
community and at some of the other 
techniques advanced by the Soviet 
Union in the past to improve that 
position. 
The Soviet Union began under condi-
tions that implicitly denied the validity 
of traditional international law as the 
regulating idea of the traditional system 
of nation-states. Upon coming into the 
international community the Soviet 
Union was very much in a minority. 
Even today, though it is stronger, and 
has several satellites and many friends in 
power and out of power throughout the 
world, the Soviet Union.both feels itself 
to be in a minority still and finds it 
useful for certain purposes of morals 
and ideology to emphasize, at times, 
that it is beleaguered by a hostile 
majority. To the extent that the interna-
tional community was a going concern, 
Soviet views were alien and Soviet 
policies were distrusted. Not only were 
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the doctrines of international law in 
many respects disagreeable or hamper-
ing from the Soviet point of view, but 
the processes by which international 
legal doctrine was made and applied 
seemed, under Soviet analysis, to be 
necessarily exclusive and anti-Soviet. 
The facts indeed lent some support to 
this opinion. 
In such a situation, Soviet interna-
tional law theory, whatever its twists in 
accompaniment to the course of Soviet 
foreign relations, made use of a variety 
of techniques to depreciate the existing 
process of international norm-formation 
and to enlarge the role to be reserved 
for the Soviet Union in those processes. 
There was the time when international 
law was generally repudiated, later to be 
accepted during a period of transition 
admitted to be necessary before interna-
tional law could be discarded along with 
the system of independent nation-states. 
There was the assertion that a state 
whose polity was based upon a new and 
juster social theory had the right and 
duty to repudiate those particular doc-
trines of international law that offended 
that theory. There was the continued 
insistence upon the primacy of treaties 
as sources of international law, the 
belittling of the rule of custom, the 
stress upon the necessity of the consent 
of a state before that state could be 
bound by a rule. When the United 
Nations Charter was adopted, with its 
institutional arrangements allowing a 
very important role to the Soviet Union, 
and its text corresponding in many ways 
to the demands upon which Soviet 
representatives had insisted. Soviet pub-
licists began to exalt what was called the 
international law of the Charter over 
what was called traditional international 
law. For some time it looked as though 
primary stress was to be laid by Soviet 
international law theorists upon the 
institution known throughout the world 
as "generally recognized principles of 
law," or "the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations. " 
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While I have listed these techniques 
roughly in the chronological order of 
their appearance, it should be kept in 
mind that there was no neat sequence of 
use, abandonment, replacement. Many 
of them are alive today, though not 
flourishing. They all have been over-
shadowed, even if not quite superseded, 
by the emphasis upon the principle of 
peaceful coexistence. What counts, for 
this purpose, is not that the principle 
shall mean anything special rather than 
anything else, or indeed that it shall 
mean anything at all. What counts is 
that something under the name of "the 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" 
should win recognition-without defini-
tion, preferably-as lying at the heart of 
international law; that it should be 
acknowledged the world over that to 
define "the Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence" is the most urgent task of 
contemporary international law; that it 
should be acknowledged that the 
process of defining them requires the 
participation and consent of the Soviet 
Union; and by implication, that any 
principle or doctrine of international 
law that has not been accepted by the 
Soviet Union as part of, or consistent 
with, "the Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence" has to be rejected as being 
for that reason invalid. 
There, in my opinion, we have the 
chief significance of "the Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence" in contemporary 
Soviet work on international law. There, 
too, we have the explanation for the 
hospitality of the Soviet publicists 
toward so many of the items furnished 
on provisional lists of principles of 
peaceful coexistence by Yugoslavia, 
Americans, Canadians, and others. They 
are hospitable because at the present 
stage of their campaign the content of 
"Peaceful Coexistence" does not matter 
for their main purpose. There will be 
arguments about the content, but those 
can expediently be postponed until a 
later stage when the centrality of the 
(undefined) "Principles" has been 
conceded by the rest of the world. To 
this end, many particular questions of 
content can be sacrificed for the time 
being if the sacrifice will purchase agree-
ment to the procedural claim, to the 
essential idea that their notion of peace-
ful coexistence is central to interna-
tional law. At the Brussels meeting of 
the International Law Association a 
year ago, for instance, the Soviet delega-
tion, led by the most eminent currently 
authoritative Soviet international law-
yer, were willing to admit a good many 
topics to the list of issues discussable 
under the heading of "Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence;" but when an 
attempt was made to change the name 
of the pertinent committee to drop the 
slogan of peaceful coexistence and bring 
the title into line with that used in the 
United Nations, the Soviet delegation 
quit work in the committee until the 
change of name was blocked. Their 
attachment to the name was not an 
attachment to the fact described by the 
name, or to the content they had been 
suggesting for the name, but a recogni-
tion of the utility of the slogan in 
serving other goals than this one and of 
the energy that, having been invested in 
its dissemination in international law 
circles, would be wasted in part if it had 
to be transferred to a new set of words. 
In drawing this picture of the inter-
national law uses of the Soviet emphasis 
upon "Peaceful Coexistence," I may 
have overrationalized the mental 
processes of Soviet lawyers, who may 
well not have planned it all at once. And 
I have no intention of asserting that the 
engine they have tried to build will roll 
along the planned route, or even that 
the route cannot change. The Yugoslavs 
and the Communist Chinese know how 
wide the swings can be. 
Such are the main features of Soviet 
work in international law as they seem 
to strike the observer today. Have we 
any warrant for expecting them to alter 
soon? In some directions we may be 
justified in supposing the changes in the 
global situation of the Soviet regime to 
do their work in affecting Soviet inter-
national law. For example, the strong 
emphasis placed by Soviet doctrine on 
territorial sovereignty may be affeeted 
by several contemporary developments: 
First, the Soviet Union is acquiring 
power, influence, and attendant respon-
sibilities in areas not contiguous to the 
Soviet Union, and the map on which 
they, the Soviet leaders, plan their 
political moves, looks a little more like a 
globe than it did in Stalin's time. 
Second, trade and aid, while still minute 
by our standards, are beginning to play 
a more significant role than before in 
Soviet cconomy and in Soviet foreign 
policy. Third, the Soviet Union is be-
coming more active in impinging upon 
other states in ways that are within the 
purview of international law, not least 
in their deployment of naval and osten-
sibly civilian vessels. (When Admiral 
Mott, by the way, spoke of the recipro-
cal interest in innocent passage, I was 
reminded of an old Russian proverb 
with a liquid setting and perhaps a naval 
application: "Don't spit in the well: you 
may want to drink from it later.') 
These factors are opposed, and per-
haps still for a time will be outweighed, 
by the weight of history and training, 
the continued situation of the Soviet 
Union as a huge land power potentially 
threatened by action by sea and air, the 
continuing political advantage to be 
derived among nations of the Southern 
Hemisphere by espousing extreme con-
cepts of sovereignty, the Soviet Union's 
perception of its minority status in most 
international fora, and the continued 
interest of the Soviet regime in restrict-
ing the access of its population to 
outside influence and the access of 
outside influences to its population. 
We should not therefore be surprised 
to see inconsistencies, hitches, conflicts 
of emphasis. Proclamations closing large 
areas of ocean to foreign fisheries, or 
enclosing large bays, and advocacy of a 
wide margin to the territorial sea, may 
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peacefully coexist with considerable so-
phistication in the use of Soviet fishing 
trawlers for not necessarily innocent 
passage; attacks upon the legality of 
United States reconnaissance satellites 
may be made in the same breath, or 
speech, with assertions of the right of the 
Soviet Union to make military use of 
space. Efforts to achieve a special theo-
retical position for legal relations among 
the states of the Soviet camp will be 
combined with bitter resistance to re-
gional groupings over which they have 
no control; they are still uneasy with a 
horizontal system, no matter whether 
the several units of that system are 
single states or groups of states. The 
mixture will be spiced with that self-
righteousness in which the Soviet au-
thorities have had so much experience 
and defended by the enforced un-
animity of the legal profession-unfortu-
nately they don't have a Quincy Wright 
of their own-but it will bear some 
resemblance to the complex and many-
shaded relationship that other great 
powers have toward international law. 
This is not, except by indirection, a 
class on American work in international 
law, and I shall not proffer detailed 
comment or advice upon the course we 
might take in reaction to, or considera-
tion of, or disregard of, the Soviet work. 
My attitude toward desirable American 
policy is perhaps best expressed ob-
liquely by a reference to the best 
defense ever given, as it seems to me, for 
Chairman Khrushchev's famous boast, 
"We will bury you." As you know, he 
has had many times to insist that the 
statement was meant only figuratively, 
that it was not meant to refer to 
particular individuals, that it was com-
patible with peaceful coexistence, that 
it has been misunderstood. But the best 
answer on Khrushchev's behalf was 
made for him more than twenty years 
before Khrushchev's statement. In 
1936, at the tercentenary of the found-
ing of Harvard College, President 
Conant moved that the meeting be 
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adjourned to the same day of the year 
2036. Ex-President Abbott Lawrence 
Lowell intervened with a comment be-
ginning with the words with which I 
should like to close: 
Before putting that motion [of 
adjournment] I want to say a 
word in its favor. If I read history 
aright human institutions have 
rarely been killed while they re-
tain vitality. They commit suicide 
or die from lack of vigor, and then 
the adversary comes and buries 
them •... 
----- '¥ -----
